We provide a new method of constructing an optimal lattice. Applying our method to the cryptanalysis of the short exponent RSA, we obtain our results which extend Boneh and Durfee's work. Our attack methods are based on a generalization to multivariate modular polynomial equation. The results illustrate the fact that one should be careful when using RSA key generation process with special parameters.
Introduction
The RSA 1 cryptosystem is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem. The modulo N of RSA cryptosystem is the product of two large prime numbers p and q, without loss of generality, we assume that p < q. The public exponent e and the secret exponent d satisfy the equation ed ≡ 1 modφ N , 1.1 where φ N p − 1 q − 1 is Euler's totient function. In a typical RSA cryptosystem, p and q have approximately the same number of bits and e < N. The most basic security requirement for public key cryptosystem is that it should be hard to recover the secret key from the public key.
In order to speed up the decryption or signing process, one might be tempted to use small secret exponent. Unfortunately, Wiener 2 showed that if d < N 1/4 , then the factorization of N can be found in polynomial time using only the public information N, e .
In 1996, Coppersmith 3 introduced two methods for finding small roots of polynomial equations using lattice reduction, where one is for the univariate modular case and the other is for the bivariate case over the integers. Coppersmith's technique has been found many applications for breaking variants of RSA; for example, Boneh and Durfee 4 improved the bound of secret exponent to d < N 0.292 , Coron and May 5 applied Coppersmith's technique to show the deterministic equivalence between recovering the secret exponent d and factoring N, and May 6 presented two polynomial time attacks for the case of imbalanced prime factors p and q.
For a given RSA modulo N, it is not difficult to get a polynomial time algorithm for finding √ N , where √ N is the integral part of N. Then p and q can be rewritten as p √ N − x 0 and q √ N y 0 , where x 0 , y 0 are unknown positive integers. Our observation is that the bound of secret exponent d of balanced RSA is related to the bound of |x 0 − y 0 |. For instance, when p and q are twin prime numbers, that is, q − p 2, then p is a root of the following polynomial:
Therefore, for any security exponent d, there often exists an algorithm that factors N with polynomial time. In general case, relations between the bound |x 0 − y 0 | and the bound of secret exponent d are obtained. Boneh and Durfee's results in 4 are special cases of our results in this paper. We reduce our method into two cases according to the size of the public exponent e and obtain the results by applying a new method of constructing a lattice basis. When e is large, set f e x, y : x y − A 1, then the polynomial f e x, y has k, U as a root modulo e, where U y 0 − x 0 and k satisfies The key ingredient of the lattice reduction technique is to construct an optimal lattice of which the dimension is as large as possible. Jochemsz and May's strategy of constructing a lattice basis 7 is to chose a continued subset of the polynomials g i 1 i 2 as a lattice basis in which there may be some bad vectors. Our most significant contribution is that we can discard all the unnecessary bad vectors in a lattice basis with a simple new way and construct a lattice whose dimension of the lattice is large enough. We construct an optimal lattice basis by choosing a discontinued subset of the polynomials g i 1 i 2 . When e is small, a difference polynomial is chosen; similar methods but more complicated are applied to construct a lattice basis. In order to show that our method is practical, the properties of resultant are considered also in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows: some lattice preliminaries are given in Section 2. Section 3 shows the proposed method of attacking the RSA with large e. Section 4 shows the method of attacking the RSA with small e. The last section is the conclusion. Let f x, y i,j a ij x i y j ∈ Z x, y be a bivariate polynomial with coefficients a ij in the ring of integers. The Euclidean norm of f is defined as the norm of the coefficient vector f
Lattice Theory
Let b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b ω ∈ Z n be linearly independent vectors with ω ≤ n. A lattice L spanned by {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b ω } is2 ij a 2 ij . Lemma 2.1. Let B {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } be a basis. On input B, the L 3 -algorithm outputs another basis {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } with v 1 ≤ v 2 ≤ 2 n/4 det L 1/ n−1 ,
in time polynomial in n and in the bit-size of the entries in B.
Based on the LLL-algorithm, Coppersmith 3 presented a method of finding small solutions to the modular polynomial which has the desired small root over the integers. Howgrave-Graham 8 formulated a useful condition on how to find such a polynomial in terms of normal of a polynomial. 
The Case for Large e
Let e, d be integers such that ed ≡ 1 modφ N . It follows that there exists an integer k satisfying
Suppose that the public key and the security key satisfy e < N α , d < N β for some α, β. In this section, we consider the case that e is of the same order of magnitude as N and therefore α is very close to 1.
By 3.1 , we have
Suppose f e x, y : x y − A 1, then the polynomial f e x, y has k, U as a root modulo e. A monomial l of f e , with coefficient a l , is called a leading monomial if there are no monomials in f e besides l that is divisible by l. Here the leading monomial of f e is xy and its coefficient is 1. Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant. Depending on 1/ε, we fix an integer m. For k ∈ {0, . . . , m 1}, we define the sets M k of monomials as
where t is a parameter to be chosen later. We note that each set M k in 7 is the whole monomials of f m−k e , while, in our method, we discard all bad rows of the lattice and consider part monomials of f m−k e . We define the following shift polynomials
for k 0, . . . , m, and
We define a lattice L by taking the coefficient vectors of g i 1 i 2 xX, yY as a basis. We can force the matrix describing L to be lower triangular. It is not difficult to see that the sets M k can be rewritten as 
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3.7
The matrix of the lattice for m 2 is shown in Table 1 .
In general, we find that the condition det L < e m ω 1−n , derived from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, can be reduced to
3.8
Assuming that |U| ≤ N γ , inequality 3.8 is equivalent to
By calculation, we obtain that 
3.10
For any m, the left hand side of 3.9 is minimized at t m 1 − β − γ /2γ. Plugging this value into 3.9 and omitting a neglect number, we have 4αγ 2βγ γ 2 − 3β 2 − 2γ 6β − 3 < 0.
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Notice that there are some bad rows in the above lattice. Next, we refine the construction method and improve the above result. In fact, the following lattice is an optimal lattice.
For k ∈ {1, . . . , m 1}, let 
3.12
The definition of shift polynomials g i 1 i 2 x, y is the same as above. From the definition of M k , we have
3.13
By some rather complex calculations, we obtain that From Lemma 2.1 and the estimations of 3.8 , it is easy to see that if
we are guaranteed to find two vectors in L that are shorter than the bound e m / dim L . The vectors are the coefficient vectors of two bivariate polynomials h 1 xX, yY and h 2 xX, yY . By Howgrave-Graham's theorem, h 1 x, y and h 2 x, y have the same root k, U over the integers. By taking resultant of h 1 x, y and h 2 x, y with respect to y, we get g x with root k. We can easily extract k from g x with standard root finding algorithms. Therefore, we can find U from h 1 x, y or h 2 x, y . This completes the description of the attack. The heuristic fact that we have in our approach is as follows.
Fact 1. The probability that the construction described above yields zero polynomial that is, g x is a zero polynomial is neglectable.
In practice, we can assume that g x is a nonzero polynomial. The following lemma shows that Fact 1 holds. In fact, if the polynomials h 1 , h 2 are random chosen, then the probability that g x is a zero polynomial is neglectable. From the above discussion, we get the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Let e, d be defined as above and
then we can factor N with polynomial time.
We note that when α 1, γ 1/2, the inequality in Theorem 3.2 becomes
which is the result in 4
The Case for Small Exponent e
In this section, we suppose that α is smaller than 1. Rewriting
by 3.1 , we have 
4.8
The matrix of the lattice for m 2 is shown in Table 2 .
In general, we find that det L < N m ω 1−n , derived from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, can be reduced to
4.9
Let |U| ≤ N γ . Hence, the inequality 4.9 is equivalent to
4.11
Plugging these value into 4.10 and omitting the neglect terms, we get that
which guarantees that we can find three vectors in L that are shorter than the bound N m / dim L . These vectors are the coefficient vectors of three trivariate polynomials f 1 xX, yY, zZ , f 2 xX, yY, zZ , and f 3 xX, yY, zZ . By Howgrave-Graham's theorem, f 1 x, y, z , f 2 x, y, z , and f 3 x, y, z have the root d, k, U over the integers. Afterward, we take the resultant of these integral polynomials with respect to the variable z and obtain two bivariate polynomials g 1 x, y and g 2 x, y with root d, k . By taking resultant of g 1 x, y and g 2 x, y with respect to y, we get g x with root d. d can be easily extracted from g x with standard root finding algorithms. Therefore, we can find k from g 1 x, y or g 2 x, y . Similarly, we can get U. By U x 0 −y 0 and N N 2 N y 0 −x 0 −x 0 y 0 , then N can be factored with polynomial time. This completes the description of the attack. The heuristic fact that we have in our approach is as follows.
Fact 2. The probability that the construction described above yields zero polynomial that is, g x is a zero polynomial is neglectable.
A similar discussion as Fact 1, we have that for random choice f 1 x, y, z , f 2 x, y, z , and f 3 x, y, z , the probability that g x is a zero polynomial is neglectable. Therefore, in practice, we can assume that g x is a nonzero polynomial. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we obtained our results by taking advantage of lattice reduction technique. By improving the Jochemsz and May 7 strategy of constructing a lattice basis, we throw the bad rows in the lattice and obtain an optimal lattice. Applying the method of constructing an optimal lattice to cryptanalyse short exponent RSA, we get the main results which extend those of Boneh and Durfee in 4 .
